Financial Deep Dive
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Copart's financial statements are the receipts for the moat — and they confirm virtually everything the business model and competitive analysis promised. Revenue has compounded from $872 million in 2011 to $4.65 billion in fiscal 2025, a 12.7% CAGR sustained over fourteen years without a single annual decline. Net income has grown every single year for fifteen consecutive years — from $166 million (2011) to $1.55 billion (2025), a 17.8% CAGR — while operating margins expanded from 30.4% to 36.5%. The business generates $1.23 billion in annual free cash flow, carries essentially zero debt ($2.7 million), and sits on $5.1 billion in cash that it has only recently begun deploying toward share repurchases. EPS per the ROIC.AI history has compounded from $0.14 (2011) to $1.42 (2024), a 19.5% CAGR over thirteen years that represents one of the most consistent per-share compounding records in public markets.
The critical question this chapter must address — flagged in Chapter 3's closing — is whether the declining ROIC trend (from 28.9% in 2019 to 16.2% in 2025) signals genuine economic deterioration or is a mathematical artifact. The answer, as the analysis will show, is overwhelmingly the latter: Copart's retained earnings and accumulating cash pile have inflated the equity base from $3.5 billion (2021) to $9.2 billion (2025), dragging down return ratios while the underlying business economics — margins, cash conversion, growth — continue to strengthen. On an operating basis, this remains one of the highest-quality financial profiles in all of industrial services.
1. REVENUE ANALYSIS: THE COMPOUND MACHINE
The revenue trajectory tells the story of the buyer liquidity flywheel described in Chapter 2, expressed in dollars. Revenue has grown in every year of the fourteen-year record, with the only meaningful deceleration occurring in fiscal 2020 (8.0% growth during the pandemic, when miles driven plummeted temporarily) and the current cyclical insurance softness.
| Year | Revenue ($M) | YoY Growth | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | $872 | — | [ROIC.AI] |
| 2013 | $1,046 | — | [ROIC.AI] |
| 2016 | $1,268 | 10.7% | [ROIC.AI] |
| 2018 | $1,806 | 24.7% | [ROIC.AI] |
| 2020 | $2,206 | 8.0% | [ROIC.AI] |
| 2022 | $3,501 | 30.0% | [ROIC.AI] |
| 2024 | $4,237 | 9.5% | [FY2024 GAAP] |
| 2025 | $4,647 | 9.7% | [FY2025 GAAP] |
Revenue CAGR calculation: ($4,647M / $872M)^(1/14) - 1 = 12.7% [ROIC.AI confirmed]. This growth is overwhelmingly organic — total acquisitions over the past decade sum to approximately $300 million, representing less than 5% of cumulative revenue generated. The 30% revenue spike in fiscal 2022 reflected a combination of elevated used vehicle prices (post-COVID supply chain effects) and strong catastrophe volume, but even normalizing for that anomalous year, the underlying trajectory sustains a low-to-mid teens growth rate.
Revenue quality is exceptional for a cyclical-adjacent business. The standard deviation of annual growth rates from 2016-2025 is approximately 7.5 percentage points, reflecting moderate variability driven primarily by catastrophe events and vehicle value fluctuations. The fee-on-value revenue model described in Chapter 3 — where Copart earns percentage-based fees on auction selling prices — provides a natural inflation hedge: when vehicle values rise, revenue per unit increases automatically. CEO Liaw confirmed on the February 2026 call that U.S. insurance ASPs grew 9% excluding catastrophe effects even as Manheim indices normalized, demonstrating that the platform's superior price discovery is increasingly the driver of revenue per unit rather than broader market forces.
The most recent quarter (Q2 FY2026) showed consolidated revenue declining 3.6% year-over-year on a reported basis but increasing 1.3% excluding catastrophe comparisons. This marks the first meaningful topline pressure in over a decade and reflects the insurance industry headwinds — consumer coverage pullbacks and softer claims activity — that management has discussed across multiple calls. The critical point: revenue per unit is increasing even as volumes decline, which is the financial fingerprint of a platform with genuine pricing power. When you can raise the effective take rate while processing fewer vehicles, the moat is doing its job.
2. PROFITABILITY: MARGINS THAT EXPAND WITH SCALE
The margin trajectory provides definitive evidence of the increasing returns to scale we documented in Chapter 3. Every margin metric has expanded meaningfully over the past decade, and the expansion has been steady rather than lumpy — ruling out one-time cost cuts or accounting gimmicks as explanations.
| Year | Gross Margin | Operating Margin | Net Margin | EBITDA Margin | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | ~88.9%* | 32.0% | 21.3% | 35.9% | [FY2016 GAAP / ROIC.AI] |
| 2018 | ~89.1%* | 32.3% | 23.1% | 36.7% | [FY2018 GAAP / ROIC.AI] |
| 2020 | 45.7% | 37.0% | 31.7% | 41.6% | [FY2020 GAAP / ROIC.AI] |
| 2022 | 45.9% | 39.3% | 31.1% | 43.2% | [FY2022 GAAP / ROIC.AI] |
| 2024 | 45.0% | 37.1% | 32.2% | 41.6% | [FY2024 GAAP / ROIC.AI] |
| 2025 | 45.2% | 36.5% | 33.3% | 41.2% | [FY2025 GAAP / ROIC.AI] |
*Note: Gross profit figures for 2016-2018 appear anomalous in the income statement data — the 2019 figure shows a negative gross profit of -$255M, which is clearly a data quality issue (likely a reclassification of cost of revenue). Operating margin from ROIC.AI is the reliable metric for this company.
Operating margin expanded from 30.4% (2011) to a peak of 42.2% (2021) before moderating to 36.5% (2025) [ROIC.AI confirmed]. The peak coincided with elevated vehicle values and lower yard costs during COVID; the current 36.5% level represents a more sustainable baseline that is still 450 basis points above the 2016 level of 32.0%. The margin moderation from the peak reflects (a) normalization of vehicle values from 2021-2022 highs, (b) increased SG&A investment in commercial capabilities and AI engineering (the 1,000-person engineering team discussed in Chapters 2-3), and (c) the dilutive margin effect of international operations (23.6% operating margin versus 37.1% in the U.S.).
Net margin has expanded more dramatically — from 21.3% (2016) to 33.3% (2025) — because the near-total elimination of debt (from $398M in 2021 to $2.7M in 2025) has removed interest expense, and the growing cash pile generates interest income. This means Copart converts 33 cents of every revenue dollar into bottom-line profit, a level of profitability typically associated with software businesses, not industrial services companies. This is the financial expression of the consignment model's elegance: no inventory risk, minimal working capital, and a cost structure dominated by fixed assets (land) that benefit from operating leverage.
3. CASH FLOW: THE OWNER'S REWARD
Cash generation is where Copart's financial quality becomes unmistakable. Operating cash flow has grown from $332 million (2016) to $1.80 billion (2025), a 5.4x increase in nine years. Free cash flow — using the standard OCF minus CapEx measure — has grown from $159 million to $1.23 billion over the same period, a 7.7x increase reflecting both operating leverage and disciplined capital expenditure.
| Year | OCF ($M) | CapEx ($M) | FCF ($M) | FCF/Net Income | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | $332 | $173* | $159 | 59% | [ROIC.AI] |
| 2018 | $535 | $288* | $247 | 59% | [ROIC.AI] |
| 2020 | $918 | $592* | $326 | 47% | [ROIC.AI] |
| 2022 | $1,177 | $338 | $839 | 77% | [FY2022 GAAP] |
| 2024 | $1,473 | $511 | $962 | 71% | [FY2024 GAAP] |
| 2025 | $1,800 | $569 | $1,231 | 79% | [FY2025 GAAP] |
*CapEx estimated from investing cash flow minus acquisitions for early years.
OCF/Net Income conversion averages approximately 116% over recent years ($1.80B OCF / $1.55B Net Income = 116% in FY2025), meaning Copart generates more cash than its income statement reports. This overcapitalization of earnings — driven by depreciation ($218M) and stock-based compensation ($38M) adding back to cash flow — is the hallmark of a business that does not require significant reinvestment merely to maintain its competitive position. The land portfolio, once acquired, does not need replacing; it appreciates.
FCF conversion (FCF/Net Income) of 79% in FY2025 is healthy but slightly below the OCF conversion because of ongoing capex investment in land. Crucially, this capex is largely growth-oriented (new yards, expanded capacity) rather than maintenance. If Copart stopped expanding tomorrow, its maintenance capex requirement would be dramatically lower than the $569M it currently invests — likely in the $150-200M range based on depreciation levels — meaning "true" maintenance FCF would be approximately $1.6 billion, or 103% of net income.
4. CLEAN EARNINGS / OWNER EARNINGS
Stock-based compensation is remarkably modest — $38 million in FY2025, representing just 0.8% of revenue and $0.04 per share. This is negligible by modern standards (compare to tech companies spending 10-20% of revenue on SBC). The low SBC level reflects Copart's founder-influenced culture and the fact that the 1,000-person engineering team, while large for the industry, is small relative to the company's scale.
Owner Earnings Calculation [FY2025]:
- Free Cash Flow: $1,231M [FY2025 GAAP]
- Less: Stock-Based Compensation: $38M [FY2025 GAAP]
- Owner Earnings: $1,193M
- Owner Earnings per share: $1,193M / 967M shares = $1.23 per share
- Owner Earnings Yield: $1,193M / $32,320M market cap = 3.69%
- Owner Earnings P/E: $33.39 / $1.23 = 27.1x
| Metric | GAAP | Owner Earnings (FCF-SBC) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| EPS | $1.60 | $1.23 | [FY2025 GAAP / Calculated] |
| P/E | 20.9x | 27.1x | [Price $33.39 / respective EPS] |
| Earnings Yield | 4.8% | 3.7% | [Inverse of P/E] |
The gap between GAAP P/E (20.9x) and Owner Earnings P/E (27.1x) is explained by the $569M in capex that is predominantly growth-oriented. If we adjust for maintenance-only capex (estimated $175M), "maintenance-adjusted FCF" would be approximately $1.59 billion or $1.64 per share, producing a maintenance-adjusted P/E of approximately 20.4x — almost identical to the GAAP P/E. This alignment between GAAP earnings and maintenance-adjusted cash earnings is unusual and signals very high earnings quality.
5. BALANCE SHEET: THE $5 BILLION WAR CHEST
Copart's balance sheet is a fortress — and the excess cash it holds is both an opportunity and the key to resolving the declining ROIC puzzle.
| Year | Total Assets ($M) | Cash ($M) | Total Debt ($M) | Equity ($M) | Net Cash ($M) | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | $4,562 | N/A | $398 | $3,529 | — | [FY2021 GAAP] |
| 2022 | $5,309 | N/A | $2 | $4,626 | — | [FY2022 GAAP] |
| 2023 | $6,738 | $1,407 | $11 | $5,987 | $1,396 | [FY2023 GAAP] |
| 2024 | $8,428 | $1,908 | ~$0 | $7,549 | ~$1,908 | [FY2024 GAAP] |
| 2025 | $10,091 | $2,009 | $3 | $9,207 | $2,006 | [FY2025 GAAP] |
| Q2 FY26 | — | $5,100* | $0 | — | $5,100 | [Earnings Call] |
*CFO Stearns stated "liquidity of approximately $6.4 billion, including cash and cash equivalents of $5.1 billion and no debt" on the Q2 FY2026 call.
The cash buildup is extraordinary: from approximately $1.4 billion in FY2023 to $5.1 billion by January 2026 — a $3.7 billion accumulation in less than three years. The balance sheet has gone from "strong" to "egregiously overcapitalized." Cash now represents approximately 16% of market capitalization ($5.1B / $32.3B). Equity has grown from $3.5 billion (2021) to $9.2 billion (2025) — a 2.6x increase in four years driven entirely by retained earnings, since the company issued no equity and did negligible buybacks until very recently.
Financial Flexibility as Strategic Asset:
- Survival runway: $5.1B cash / ~$3.0B annual operating expenses = 1.7 years of zero revenue [Calculated]
- Acquisition firepower: $5.1B cash + effectively unlimited debt capacity (zero current leverage, ~$1.9B EBITDA) = $10B+ of acquisition capacity
- Countercyclical capability: During the current insurance volume downturn, Copart is accelerating buybacks ($500M year-to-date) and continuing land investment while competitors may need to retrench
This financial fortress resolves a question from Chapter 2: Copart's competitive position is not just strengthening operationally — it is strengthening financially. The company has more dry powder than any competitor in its industry, enabling it to invest aggressively through the current cyclical weakness while IAA/RB Global manages integration complexity and acquisition debt.
6. SHARE COUNT TRAJECTORY & OWNERSHIP ACCRETION
Copart's share count history is unusual — it reflects a company that accumulated cash for years without meaningful buybacks, only recently initiating repurchases.
| Year | Shares Outstanding (M) | YoY Change | Cumulative from 2015 | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | 1,007 | — | — | [ROIC.AI] |
| 2016 | 915 | -9.1% | -9.1% | [ROIC.AI] |
| 2019 | 922 | — | -8.4% | [ROIC.AI] |
| 2021 | 945 | — | -6.2% | [ROIC.AI] |
| 2023 | 954 | — | -5.3% | [ROIC.AI] |
| 2024 | 961 | — | -4.6% | [ROIC.AI] |
| 2025 | 967 | — | -4.0% | [FY2025 10-K] |
The pattern is clear: from 2016 to 2025, shares actually increased modestly (from 915M to 967M), reflecting SBC dilution without offsetting buybacks. The aggressive buyback program in FY2016 ($443M) and FY2019 ($365M) was followed by seven years of near-zero repurchase activity. This was, frankly, a suboptimal capital allocation decision — the company accumulated billions in cash while the stock compounded at 20%+ annually, meaning every dollar of buybacks deferred was a dollar that could have purchased more per-share value at lower prices.
The recent pivot is significant: $500 million in buybacks year-to-date in FY2026, with 325.8 million shares still authorized. At an average purchase price of approximately $38 per share (estimated from 13M+ shares for $500M), the company is buying back approximately 1.3% of outstanding shares. If sustained at $1B+ annually — easily fundable from FCF alone — the share count would decline approximately 2-3% per year, adding a meaningful per-share compounding tailwind.
Ownership Accretion (Prospective):
- Current SBC dilution: ~$38M / ~$38 avg price ≈ 1.0M shares/year (~0.1% dilution)
- At $1B annual buyback pace: ~26M shares/year (~2.7% reduction)
- Net annual reduction: ~2.6%, implying passive ownership doubles in approximately 27 years
- EPS accretion from buybacks alone: ~2.6% annual bonus compounding on top of earnings growth
7. RED FLAGS AND CONCERNS
Legitimate Concern — Declining ROIC Trend:
ROIC has fallen from 28.9% (2019) to 16.2% (2025). This looks alarming in isolation but is almost entirely explained by the denominator effect. Equity grew from $1.45B per share (2019) to $8.38 per share (2025) — a 5.8x increase — while net income per share grew from $0.64 to $1.58 — a 2.5x increase. When equity grows faster than earnings because the company retains all earnings and accumulates cash, ROIC mathematically declines even though the underlying business is performing better. A cash-adjusted ROIC — subtracting the $5.1B cash pile from invested capital — would show returns substantially above the headline 16.2%. We will dissect this precisely in the ROIC chapter.
Minor Concern — Gross Profit Data Anomaly:
The income statement shows gross profit of -$255M in 2019, which is clearly a data quality issue (likely a reclassification of cost categories). Operating income and ROIC.AI operating margins show no corresponding anomaly. This does not affect the analysis but warrants noting.
No Other Material Red Flags:
- Zero debt eliminates leverage risk entirely
- Fifteen consecutive years of earnings growth with no annual decline
- No acquisitive accounting distortions (minimal M&A spend)
- SBC at 0.8% of revenue is negligible
- No pension obligations or off-balance sheet concerns visible in the data
8. BUFFETT'S FINANCIAL CRITERIA
| Criterion | Assessment | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Consistent earnings power | ✅ Exceptional | 15 consecutive years of earnings growth, zero annual declines |
| High returns on equity | ✅ Strong | ROE of 21.2% TTM; historically 25-30%+ before cash accumulation diluted returns |
| Low capital requirements | ✅ Good | Maintenance capex ~$175M on $4.6B revenue (3.8%); growth capex is discretionary |
| Strong free cash flow | ✅ Exceptional | $1.23B FCF, 79% conversion, 116% OCF/NI ratio |
| Conservative balance sheet | ✅ Extreme | Zero debt, $5.1B cash, 1.7-year zero-revenue survival |
| Pricing power | ✅ Confirmed | 9% ASP growth ex-CAT outpacing industry; fee-on-value model |
Copart meets every criterion Buffett applies to "wonderful businesses." The only asterisk is the cash hoarding period (2020-2025) that arguably underutilized the balance sheet — a venial sin that management is now correcting through buybacks.
The financial picture establishes Copart's raw earning power, margin durability, and cash generation quality beyond reasonable doubt. But the headline ROIC decline — from the high-20s to 16% — demands a precise decomposition to determine whether this franchise business is truly earning exceptional returns on the capital it deploys, or whether the growing equity base is silently compressing the returns that attracted investors in the first place. That is the question the ROIC deep-dive will resolve.